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Objective. To characterize the influence of dialysis facilities and nephrologists on
resource use and patient outcomes in the dialysis population and to illustrate how such
information can be used to inform payment system design.
Data Sources. Medicare claims for all hemodialysis patients for whom Medicare was
the primary payer in 2004, combined with the Medicare Enrollment Database and the
CMS Medical Evidence Form (CMS Form 2728), which is completed at onset of renal
replacement therapy.
Study Design. Resource use (mainly drugs and laboratory tests) per dialysis session
and two clinical outcomes (achieving targets for anemia management and dose of di-
alysis) were modeled at the patient level with random effects for nephrologist and
dialysis facility, controlling for patient characteristics.
Results. For each measure, both the physician and the facility had significant effects.
However, facilities were more influential than physicians, as measured by the standard
deviation of the random effects.
Conclusions. The success of tools such as P4P and provider profiling relies upon the
identification of providers most able to enhance efficiency and quality. This paper
demonstrates a method for determining the extent to which variation in health care costs
and quality of care can be attributed to physicians and institutional providers. Because
variation in quality and cost attributable to facilities is consistently larger than that
attributable to physicians, if provider profiling or financial incentives are targeted to only
one type of provider, the facility appears to be the appropriate locus.
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Private and public payers are focusing on measuring and rewarding quality
and efficiency in health care (Milgate and Cheng 2006; Rosenthal et al. 2006).
Such efforts include ‘‘pay-for-performance’’ (P4P) systems that reward mea-
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sured performance, capitation systems that put providers at financial risk for
high utilization, and tiered networks in which insurers use measured perfor-
mance to assign providers to ‘‘preferred’’ status levels.
A key component of the design of such systems is the determination of
whose performance to measure and reward. Typically, patients have contact
with multiple physicians and institutions (Pham et al. 2007). For example,
surgical outcomes could be affected by the surgeon, the surgical team (sur-
geons, nurses, and anesthetists), and the institution where the surgery was
performed. Therefore, determining rules regarding attribution of outcomes to
providers creates major challenges in payment system design. Failure to ac-
curately identify the provider or providers with the greatest influence on out-
comes could adversely affect the credibility and impact of the payment system,
and it could make providers accountable for decisions outside their control.
Similarly, the validity of provider profiles, which are being developed for
quality assessment and improvement (Bodenheimer 1999) using more rigor-
ous methods (Huang et al. 2005; Shahian et al. 2005; Zheng et al. 2006), also
depends on whether they identify the providers with the greatest ability to
affect the outcome the policy maker is trying to influence.
In principle, outcomes could be measured and rewarded for any or all of
the providers or types of providers involved in a patient’s care. However,
doing so would present a variety of challenges. Data may not be available
across all providers and only limited case mix adjusters may be available to
control for differences in the patient populations. Even when data are avail-
able, statistical power to differentiate outcome variations associated with
different physicians and facilities is often limited by sample size. Likewise,
providers treating atypical patient populations could face substantial financial
risks under a prospective payment system (PPS).
Owing in part to these difficulties, decisions about whom to measure and
reward have generally not been based on empirical analyses of the relative
impact of particular providers (or of different types of providers) on outcomes.
Rather, decisions about which provider (or type of provider) to attribute
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responsibility have been based on factors such as convenience (e.g., mea-
surement at the institutional level due to easier availability of data or large
sample sizes), prospective assignment of patients to a designated ‘‘gatekeeper’’
physician (Rosenthal et al. 2006), or arbitrary retrospective rules such as at-
tributing responsibility to all providers with a minimum level of patient con-
tact or to the single provider with the most patient contact during the year
(Dudley and Rosenthal 2006; Milgate and Cheng 2006). The Medicare
Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) as well as physicians and their
professional societies have expressed concern regarding the attribution meth-
ods in use today (American College of Cardiology 2006; Milgate and Cheng
2006; Sinsky 2007; American Academy of Family Physicians 2008).
This paper uses renal dialysis services to demonstrate a method
for identifying the extent to which different types of providers influence vari-
ation in resource use and patient outcomes. Dialysis provides an excellent
context for this study. Patients have ongoing relationships with both an
institutional provider (the dialysis facility) and a physician (the nephrologist
who manages dialysis-related services). Multiple nephrologists practice within
most dialysis facilities, and most nephrologists practice in multiple facilities.
This double ‘‘cross-over’’ facilitates the statistical identification of physician
and facility effects on outcomes. Because the vast majority of dialysis patients
are insured by Medicare, available data include a large number of patients.
Further, detailed clinical data are available to adjust for case mix. Finally,
several clinical performance measures are well established and relatively
well accepted.
Dialysis facilities have a financial incentive to increase the use of the
services, primarily injectable medications, which are paid on a fee-for-service
basis by Medicare. However, physicians, who generally do not profit from
these services, are ultimately responsible for prescribing care. Given the recent
controversy about appropriate anemia management in dialysis facilities, these
issues are particularly salient. Researchers have presumed that the organiza-
tion is the decision making locus (e.g., Thamer et al. 2007), while others have
argued that institutional protocols are physician driven and modified by
individual physicians in response to patient condition (Lazarus and Hakim
2007).
Although outcomes and resource utilization may depend on both the
dialysis facility and the nephrologist, public reporting of performance measures
(Dialysis Facility Compare; http://www.cms.hhs.gov/DialysisFacilityCom-
pare/), quality improvement initiatives (e.g., http://www.esrdnetworks.org),
P4P proposals (Milgate and Cheng 2006), and the development of an ex-
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panded case mix–adjusted dialysis PPS as required by the Medicare Prescrip-
tion Drug, Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003 (Pub. L. 108-173)
all use the dialysis facility as the locus of measurement and/or reward. Not
only does this implicitly attribute responsibility to the facility for the practices
of nonemployee physicians but also failure to report at the physician level
provides no guidance to patients regarding choice of physician, and
failure to provide physician incentives may forego opportunities to improve
care.
Two prior studies are particularly relevant. Krein et al. (2002) developed
an empirical basis for deciding which provider level to profile (facility, pro-
fessional group, or physician) in the context of diabetes care in the Veterans
Administration (VA) system. They found that for outcome and resource use
measures, variation at the facility level is dramatically higher than that at the
physician level. Physician variation was substantial only for narrow process
measures (ordering of specific laboratory tests), and the provider group ex-
plained relatively little variation in any measure. However, their study was
limited to 13 facilities in one VA region.
A second prior study investigated the relative variation of resource
use in U.S. dialysis facilities across four levels: facilities, nephrologists, patients,
and time (different months for a given patient) (Turenne et al. 2008).
The analysis of four levels of variation created computational limitations
which required a sampling strategy that limited the analysis to a 4 percent
random sample of facilities and distinguished provider-level effects only
through multiple physicians practicing within a facility (and not from
physicians practicing in multiple facilities). Although this study also found
that the variation across facilities exceeded across physicians, the physician-
level variation was relatively more important than that found by Krein,
with financially significant variation in resource use across both facilities and
physicians.
The current study extends this previous research in several significant
ways. First, by aggregating data across multiple months for each patient,
this study uses data from almost all physician-facility pairs and both types
of ‘‘cross-over’’ between physicians and facilities. Second, the prior dialysis
study only examined resource utilization (costs per dialysis session for a set of
services, primarily injectable medications and laboratory tests). The current
study uses the same utilization measure but adds two outcome measures
(achieving treatment targets for dose of dialysis and anemia management).
Third, this study uses slightly more recent data (2004) than the prior dialysis
study (2003).
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RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
Our primary objectives are to characterize the influence of dialysis facilities
and nephrologists on resource use and patient outcomes and to suggest how
such information could inform payment system design. Therefore, we wish to
build a model that controls for case mix factors that may vary across providers.
We expect that resource use and outcomes are influenced by observed and
unobserved patient characteristics. Based on prior research, we identified a set
of potential case mix adjusters (Hirth et al. 2003, 2007; Wheeler et al. 2006).
Given that each dialysis patient has an ongoing relationship with both a di-
alysis facility and a nephrologist, we also expect that utilization of services and
clinical outcomes could be independently influenced by facility and physician.
Because of the focus on payment policy, we do not consider provider char-
acteristics such as nonprofit status or membership in a dialysis chain because
the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) would be unlikely to
implement payment levels or incentives specific to these provider subgroups.
Conversely, distinguishing between facilities and physicians is useful because
separate performance measures, payment rates, and incentives could be
designed for each type of provider.
METHODS
Data Sources
Data for this study come from several CMS sources. Medicare claims for all
renal dialysis patients for whom Medicare was the primary payer in 2004
(307,805 patients) were used to identify resource utilization, dose of dialysis,
and anemia management. Demographic information was obtained from the
Medicare Enrollment Database and the CMS Medical Evidence Form (CMS
Form 2728), which is completed at onset of renal replacement therapy (RRT).
Height, weight, and several patient comorbidities present at the start of RRT
are also reported on CMS Form 2728. Diagnosis codes reported on Medicare
claims between 1999 and 2004 were used to identify comorbidities that were
not included on CMS Form 2728 and to capture changes in patient condition
since start of RRT.
Assignment of Patients to Facilities and Physicians
Medicare provider identification numbers and unique physician identification
numbers (UPINs) as reported on monthly dialysis claims were used to identify
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the treating facilities and physicians. For 75.8 percent of the analysis sample,
this process identified a unique physician/facility pair that delivered all care
during 2004; the remaining patients switched facilities and/or physicians,
resulting in more than one record for that patient.
Dependent Variables
Resource use was measured based on Medicare allowable payments (MAP)
from Medicare claims. MAP includes both Medicare payments and patient
co-pay obligations, and therefore reflects a societal perspective on resource
use. Secondary analyses take Medicare’s perspective as a payer by excluding
patient obligations. Three types of services were included in this utilization
measure. The first is injectable medications (primarily erythropoietin [EPO],
iron, and vitamin D products) billed by dialysis facilities. The second is lab-
oratory tests that were either billed by dialysis facilities or ordered by phy-
sicians receiving monthly capitation payments for treating ESRD patients and
billed by freestanding laboratory suppliers on Medicare carrier claims. This
includes a broad spectrum of tests, including those used to monitor patient
response to medications. The third and smallest category includes other ser-
vices billed by dialysis facilities, such as syringes and other supplies that may
be used with medications or laboratory tests. Taken together, these are the
services that are currently billed on a fee-for-service basis, but they are ex-
pected to become part of an expanded, prospectively paid bundle of services
subsequent to Medicare legislation passed in 2008. The costs of the dialysis
treatment itself are not included because they have been paid as a prospective
bundle since 1983. Therefore, Medicare claims reflect only the number of
treatments received, and not patient-level utilization of resources. Restricting
the measure of resource use to those services billed separately from the dialysis
treatment addresses the current policy context of expanding the prospective
bundle and the ongoing controversy about the intensity of anemia manage-
ment, which accounts for the majority of these services.
These MAPs were summed across all treatments delivered to each pa-
tient during the year while under the care of a given physician/facility dyad,
and they were then standardized to the number of outpatient dialysis sessions
by calculating the average MAP per session. This standardization is appro-
priate because dialysis units have little discretion over the number of treat-
ments delivered per unit of time. Medicare pays for only three treatments per
week and almost all patients are on that schedule. Medicare grants medical
exceptions allowing a fourth weekly treatment for o1 percent of patients, and
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less than 1 percent of patients receive two weekly treatments (these are in-
dividuals who retain residual renal function during the first months of dialysis).
We capped outlier values for average EPO MAP/session (4$300 or
430,000 units/session, which represented 1.2 percent of claims and may
reflect clinically implausible or inappropriate doses). CMS currently places a
similar limit on EPO reimbursement (500,000 units/month). Extreme values
for MAP/session for all other services were capped at the greater of the upper
outer fence (75th percentile1[3  interquartile range]) or the 99th percentile
of the distribution. These caps were employed to prevent a few extreme values
from contributing a disproportionate share of variance.
The other dependent variables were clinical measures reported on
claims submitted by dialysis facilities. The first measure is the urea reduction
ratio (URR), which indicates the percent of urea removed from the patient’s
blood during the dialysis treatment. Therefore, this variable represents the
‘‘dose’’ of dialysis delivered. Clinical guidelines call for a URR of at least 65
percent (http://www.kidney.org/professionals/kdoqi/guidelines_updates/
doqi_uptoc.html#hd, accessed on February 6, 2008) and CMS reports the
percentage of patients achieving this target at the facility level. Because renal
failure patients often have some residual renal function when starting dialysis,
URR is not a pure measure of dose. Therefore, we excluded months occurring
during a patient’s first year of dialysis from the URR analysis. The second
measure is hematocrit (HCT), which indicates how well anemia is being
managed.1 Clinical guidelines call for maintaining a HCT of at least 33 percent
(http://www.kidney.org/professionals/KDOQI/guidelines_anemia/index.htm,
accessed on February 6, 2008), and CMS also reports the percentage of pa-
tients achieving this target at the facility level. Potential adverse effects of HCT
levels substantially above the target value became controversial after the pe-
riod of this study (2004), but revised guidelines have continued to call for a
minimum value of 33 percent.
Analysis Sample
307,805 chronic renal failure patients were identified in the Medicare claims as
having received outpatient dialysis during 2004, over 90 percent of whom
received in-center hemodialysis. To create a more homogeneous study pop-
ulation, we excluded patients receiving other dialysis modalities (primarily
peritoneal dialysis) because they tend to use fewer injectable medications than
hemodialysis patients and because the URR target of 65 percent applies only
to hemodialysis patients. In addition, we excluded patients who received less
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than 1 month of outpatient hemodialysis (o13 sessions), and those treated by
physician/facility dyads with fewer than five patients. Finally, patients with
missing values for the dependent variables, physician identifiers, or several
key case mix adjusters (e.g., body size measures) were excluded. The analysis
sample contains 196,670 unique patients, treated by 4,166 facilities, 4,820
physicians, and 10,737 facility/physician pairs. There were 8,714 facility/
physician pairs treating at least five patients for the URR analysis sample due
to exclusion of patient-months during first year of dialysis. The average phy-
sician/facility pair cared for 18.3 patients. Due to computational limitations,
the MAP/session and HCT models were estimated using an 80 percent ran-
dom sample of the data. The URR model was estimated using 100 percent of
the data.
Variance Components Analyses
Multilevel mixed effects models were used to estimate the variation in
resource use associated with dialysis facilities, physicians, and patients. The
following linear mixed model was estimated (Searle, Casella, and McCulloch
1992; Verbeke and Molenberghs 2000; Goldstein 2003):
Yf ;d ;p ¼ Xpbþ ef þ ed þ ef ;d ;p; ð1Þ
where Yf ;d ;p is the average MAP/session for facility f, physician d, and patient
p; Xp is a vector of patient characteristics that are included as risk adjusters, and
b is the corresponding vector of coefficients. There are random effects for
facility (ef ), physician (ed), and the residual error for each patient (ef ;d ;p). To
determine the impact of case mix adjustment on the relative and absolute
contributions of physicians and facilities to observed variation, unadjusted
models (without covariates Xp) were also estimated.
A linear cost model was estimated for ease of interpretation and because
preliminary analyses revealed only mild skewness. Some use of the laboratory
tests and drugs was nearly universal (less than .1 percent of patients had zero
costs), and the skewness of the tail was limited (99th percentile of spending was
less than four times the mean). A log-transformed model was estimated as a
sensitivity analysis.
For the clinical performance measures, the dependent variables repre-
sented the proportion of months in which the patient achieved the URR and
HCT targets. In addition to the linear specifications, alternative specifications
were estimated to ensure that conclusions regarding the absolute and relative
magnitudes of variation at the physician and facility level were not sensitive to
functional form. In particular, the data-generating process underlying the
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proportions can be thought of as a series of binomial trials (meet the target or
not in a given month). Therefore, we estimated a generalized linear model
(GLM) with a binomial error distribution with a logit link function for a 20
percent random sample of the data. However, because some patients were
consistently more or less likely than average to meet the targets, the actual
distribution of the proportions was bimodal (reflecting overdispersion relative
to the binomial error distribution). Therefore, we also estimated GLM models
with dichotomized outcomes based on whether the target was met in 450
percent of months to determine if the conclusions are robust to the functional
form of the models.
The prediction error that results from the difference between actual
Yf ;d ;p and predicted Ŷf ;d ;p ¼ Xpb̂ outcomes has a separate component for each
of the three levels of variation:
Yf ;d ;p  Ŷf ;d ;p ¼ êf þ êd þ êf ;d ;p: ð2Þ
The estimated facility component (̂ef ) reflects consistently higher or lower
outcomes than predicted for individual facilities compared with an average
facility. Similarly, the estimated physician component (̂ed ) captures consis-
tently higher or lower outcomes than predicted for individual physicians
compared with the average physician, given the facility in which the physician
practices. The estimated residuals (̂ef ;d ;p) reflect the remaining unexplained
variation from patient to patient.
The magnitudes of the prediction error components were compared
using standard deviations (SD) (e.g., SD of êp). These models were estimated
using the lmer procedure in R (version 2.2.1; Faraway 2006). To assess model
fit, we checked the residual plots at patient level, physician level, and facility
level, finding only mild deviations from normality.
Case Mix Measures
Patient characteristics identified as potential case mix adjusters included age,
sex, race, Hispanic ethnicity, and Medicaid eligibility at the onset of renal
failure, rural versus urban location, duration of RRT, HCT, and body size at
the start of RRT, plus 39 comorbid conditions. Comorbidities included heart
disease, cancer, infections, anemia, and bleeding conditions that were
expected to affect resource use and clinical outcomes. Only recent claims
diagnoses were used for acute conditions (e.g., within 3 months for gastro-
intestinal bleeding) or in cases where preliminary bivariate analyses for
chronic conditions revealed that recent diagnoses were more highly predictive
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(based on the comparisons of diagnoses reported within 1, 2, or 5 years). These
characteristics represent a more inclusive list of factors that would likely be
used to risk adjust an expanded PPS.
RESULTS
To statistically distinguish variations at the facility and physician levels, it is
necessary that some facilities have multiple physicians and/or some physi-
cians treat patients at multiple facilities. Both types of crossover occurred
frequently in the dialysis setting. In nearly two-thirds of facilities, more than
one physician cared for at least five patients (frequency distribution shown in
Figure 1). Similarly, more than half of physicians cared for at least five patients
in multiple facilities (Figure 2). Descriptive statistics appear in Table 1.
Variation across facilities, physicians, and patients for the entire sample
is described in Table 2. For purposes of illustration, variation at the physician,
facility, and patient levels are characterized as the mean for the outcome
variable  1 SD. A consistent result is that variation across facilities exceeded
that across physicians, with SD at the facility level more than double those
observed at the physician level. In addition, the results show that variation
across providers was considerably lower than variation across individual
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Figure 1: Frequencies of Physicians by Facility
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To determine the effect of case mix adjustment on the variation attrib-
utable to providers, Table 3 reports adjusted and unadjusted SDs across fa-
cilities, physicians, and patients. Case mix adjustment generally decreased the
SDs, but only to a modest extent. Both the absolute magnitudes of the SDs
across providers and the relative magnitudes of the facility and physician SDs
remained similar after case mix adjustment. Finally, the alternative functional
forms did not affect the qualitative conclusions. For SB MAP/session, vari-
ances in the log model were transformed to the dollar scale using the delta
method (Casella and Berger 2002). The transformed SDs at the facility, phy-
sician, and patient levels were about 10 percent lower than those from the
linear specification, but the relative magnitudes were virtually unchanged.
Likewise, for the clinical measures the absolute and relative variation at the
three different levels was very similar in the alternative, GLM specifications.
Using only actual Medicare payments per dialysis session (that is, excluding
patient obligations) as a measure of resource use reduced mean spending to
$93.01 per session and resulted in SDs of $6.51 across physicians, $18.38
across facilities, and $49.74 across patients.
DISCUSSION
The success of attempts to improve care through P4P and provider profiling
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Figure 2: Frequencies of Facilities by Physician
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quality. Using renal dialysis services, we demonstrate a method for determin-
ing the extent to which variation in health care costs and quality can be
attributed to physicians and institutional providers. Essentially, variation at the
provider level serves as a proxy for the degree of control over clinical resource
Table 1: Characteristics of Medicare Hemodialysis Patients, 2004
Variable
Study Samplen
N or Mean SD
Levels of variation
Number of dialysis facilities 4,166
Number of physicians 4,820
Number of patients 196,670
Patients per facility/physician pair 18.3
Dependent variables
Average MAP per dialysis session including patient obligation $113.06 $69.67
Average MAP per dialysis session excluding patient obligation $93.08 $57.46
Urea reduction ratio  65% 90.20%









Hematocrit at start of RRT 29.4 5.4
Cardiac dysrhythmia within 1 year 35.7%
Cardiac arrest within 5 years 2.7%
Metastatic cancer within 5 years 2.8%
Acquired hemolytic anemias within 1 year 1.5%
Unable to ambulate 2.8%
AIDS diagnosis within 5 years 1.9%
Rural 16.7%
Medicaid eligibility 27.3%
Race (Native American) 1.5%
Race (Asian or Pacific Islander) 3.3%
Race (Black) 36.0%
Race (White) 57.0%
Race (other or unknown) 2.1%
Hispanic 13.0%
nIncludes all Medicare hemodialysis patients with available case-mix measures (including but not
limited to those shown above) and physician identifiers (for physician counts and ratios), who
received at least 13 hemodialysis treatments and were treated by a facility/physician pair with at
least five patients.
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utilization or outcomes (Young 2008). This analysis allowed us to use the two-
way crossover between physicians and facilities to identify the sources of
variation. Earlier studies relied primarily on crossover arising from multiple
Table 2: Variation in Resource Use and Quality Measures across Physicians,
Facilities, and Patients, Adjusted for Case Mix
Physician (n 5 4,280) Dialysis Facility (n 5 4,166) Patient (n 5 165,465)
Resource use for separately billable services ($/session)n
Mean1SD $120.30 $135.35 $173.08
Mean $112.96 $112.96 $112.96
MeanSD $105.62 $90.57 $52.84
Percent of months with hematocrit  33%
Mean1SD 79.58% 83.48% 100.00%
Mean 77.03% 77.03% 77.03%
MeanSD 74.48% 70.58% 49.67%
Physician (n 5 4,456) Dialysis Facility (n 5 3,978) Patient (n 5 141,312)
Percent of months with URR  65%w
Mean1SD 92.72% 96.50% 100.00%
Mean 90.20% 90.20% 90.20%
MeanSD 87.68% 83.90% 70.52%
nNumber of physician/facility pairs: 10,737. Results are based on an 80% random sample.
Resource use included patient obligations.
wNumber of physician/facility pairs: 8,714.
Table 3: Effect of Case-Mix Adjustment on Variation across Providers and
Patients
Physician Dialysis Facility Patient
Resource use for separately billable services ($/session)n
SD (unadjusted) $7.55 $24.52 $64.64
SD (adjusted) $7.34 $22.39 $60.12
Percent of months with hematocrit  33%
SD (unadjusted) 2.64% 6.90% 28.25%
SD (adjusted) 2.55% 6.45% 27.36%
Percent of months with URR  65%w
SD (unadjusted) 2.73% 6.54% 20.75%
SD (adjusted) 2.52% 6.30% 19.68%
nNumber of physician/facility pairs: 10,737. Results are based on an 80% random sample.
Resource use included patient obligations.
wNumber of physician/facility pairs: 8,714.
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physicians practicing in relatively small samples of facilities (Krein et al. 2002;
Turenne et al. 2008).
Variation in quality and cost attributable to facilities was larger than that
attributable to physicians for all three measures. Therefore, the results con-
firmed those from the limited sample used in the earlier analysis of resource
utilization (Turenne et al. 2008) and generalize them to two important clinical
performance measures. They were also broadly consistent with Krein et al.’s
(2002) finding that facility mattered more than physician. However, the share
of variation attributable to physicians appears higher in dialysis care than for
similar measures in the VA diabetes context.
Given the greater variation found at the institutional level, if provider
profiling or financial incentives such as P4P or bundled payments are targeted
to only one type of provider, the dialysis facility appears to be the more
appropriate locus. This suggests that incentives for quality and efficiency can
be directed toward organized providers, consistent with conclusions drawn by
Sautter et al. (2007) based on their evaluation of hospital P4P. They conclude
that institutional providers are able to bring organizational resources to bear in
response to incentives and thereby improve care processes. Nonetheless, the
existence of clinically meaningful variation across physicians implies that
quality reports, bundled payments, and P4P may place facilities at risk for
outcomes they only partially control. Further, physicians may be relatively
more influential in a subset of facilities, potentially making them a better target
for incentives. Likewise, physicians may influence protocols at the facility
level, so it is possible that the average effects reported here understate phy-
sicians’ contributions to the facility’s clinical practices.
The financial impact of the observed variation in resource use was large,
with the facility-level SD of $22.39 per session translating into to $179,120 for
a moderately sized facility performing 8,000 hemodialysis treatments annu-
ally. Similarly, clinical variations occurring at the facility and physician levels
were meaningful. Relative to the percentage of patients failing to attain treat-
ment targets (10 percent for URR and 23 percent for HCT), the magnitude of
the outcome variations observed across providers (SDs of 3 percent across
physicians and 6–7 percent across facilities) was substantial. Therefore, co-
operation between managers and physicians in the development and adoption
of protocols to optimize clinical outcomes and resource utilization is likely to
become increasingly important under P4P programs and proposed reforms to
pay prospectively for drugs and lab tests. Further, methods to align incentives
of dialysis facilities and nephrologists should be developed. These findings
support MedPAC’s position that facilities and physicians should both be
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included in dialysis P4P programs in order to encourage collaboration (Mil-
gate and Cheng 2006).
This line of research may also help inform which interventions are most
likely to improve performance. As noted by Young (2008), identifying per-
formance variation across facilities suggests that managerial intervention may
be successful (e.g., improvements in the organization’s health information
technology), while the existence of variation across physicians points to the use
of measures such as evidence-based guidelines. Young also noted that the type
of provider to which incentives are targeted will itself influence the types of
investments made to improve performance. For example, programs targeting
individual physicians are unlikely to induce organizational infrastructure in-
vestments. Indeed, the substantial residual variation at the patient level also
suggests that efforts such as encouraging patient compliance with therapy
could also be valuable.
Several limitations should be noted. First, the random effects identified
the statistical contribution of providers to observed outcomes, but they cannot
distinguish differences arising from discretionary practices from those arising
from unobserved case-mix differences. However, our conclusions were robust
to controlling for a much broader set of comorbidities than is used to case mix
adjust the current, publicly reported dialysis facility outcomes data. Second,
MAP/session is a cost measure based on utilization and payment rates. Actual
input costs were not available and may affect provider practices. Third, other
levels of variation may exist beyond those explored here (e.g., physician
groups and chains of facilities) and could be explored in future research.
Fourth, it is likely that the physician UPINs reported on dialysis claims mis-
identify the primary physician for some patients. This would bias estimates of
physician’s contributions downward. Finally, physicians might have greater
influence in other domains such as hospitalization.
Future research could apply similar methods to determine the extent to
which patterns observed in dialysis generalize to other settings. For example,
the dialysis setting has similarities to the choice of a primary care physician
(PCP) in a managed care plan. In both settings, the assignment of a patient to a
responsible physician is seemingly straightforward, but other types of pro-
viders may still contribute to measured performance. Similar analytic methods
could also be used to assess the validity of common, but arbitrary, attribution
rules (e.g., attributing outcomes to the physician who accounted for the plu-
rality of visits during a year). For example, the relationship between percent-
age of visits accounted for by the primary and secondary providers and their
respective effects on observed outcomes could be estimated.
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To the extent that these analyses can help policy makers and insurers
understand the sources of cost and outcome variation, they will be more able
to develop appropriate and effective monitoring, reporting, and incentive
systems. Likewise, such information can be used by providers to identify
opportunities for improvement and to anticipate and manage financial risks
and opportunities under such systems.
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NOTE
1. Erythropoietin stimulates the production of red blood cells. Almost all patients with
chronic kidney failure experience anemia due to the lack of natural erythropoietin
production by their kidneys. CMS requires reporting of the patient’s HCT level in
order for a facility to receive payment for any of the erythropoietin-stimulating
agents used to treat anemia. Therefore, in the small percentage of patient-months in
which none of these drugs are billed, HCT values are usually unreported.
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